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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF-INCRIMINATION-USE OF CONFESSIONS FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSEs-The United States Supreme Court has held
that the voluntary confessions of a criminally accused, made in the
absence of full Miranda warnings, may be used to impeach his credi-
bility.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Harris was indicted on two counts for selling narcotics to an under-
cover agent, and he was convicted on one count. During his trial,
Harris took the stand to state that he had put only baking powder,
not heroin, into the envelopes he sold to the police agent. On cross-
examination, the prosecutor attempted to impeach his credibility by
referring to his prior in-custody statement, made soon after his arrest,
when he had not been warned of his right to counsel. Two portions
of his inconsistent statenent were read, involving his confession that
he had acted as an agent for the undercover officer in order to purchase
narcotics and that he had purchased narcotics from an unknown person.
Harris appealed, and the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court,' in affirming his conviction, considered whether in-
custody statements of the accused could be used for impeaching pur-
poses when obtained in absence of the warnings outlined in Miranda
v. Arizona.2 The latter court adhered to a New York Court of Ap-
peals' pre-Miranda ruling,3 which stated that a confession could be
used for impeachment purposes, although it could not be used for a
prosecutor's case in chief. When Harris appealed further, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the Miranda case had no effect on
the use of confessions for impeachment. 4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 5 to consider
whether a confession made in the absence of full Miranda warnings
could be used to impeach the defendant's credibility.
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the majority, stated that the ad-
missibility of a confession into evidence for impeachment purposes
was not to be decided on the basis of the Miranda criteria, but on
the long accepted judicial standard of voluntariness. The Court said
that Miranda specifically excluded a "tainted" confession from a pros-
1. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1969).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 31 App. Div. 2d at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 249, citing People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318,
274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 221 N.E.2d 541 (1966).
4. People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71, 250 N.E.2d 349 (1969).
5. 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
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ecutor's case in chief;6 Miranda's assumed effect of eliminating police
misconduct in questioning a suspect was thereby fully satisfied.7 Ac-
cording to Chief Justice Burger, however, a secondary and saving use
of the "tainted," voluntary confession should be allowed. He reasoned
that impeaching the defendant's credibility on cross-examination
would counter his temptation to commit perjury on the witness stand.,
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Douglas and Justice Marshall, had no argument against the vol-
untary test for confessions, that had been joined with the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 9 but said that the Miranda case
presented a new constitutional reason for total exclusion of a defen-
dant's confession. The dissent stated that the Miranda criteria for ex-
cluding a confession were based upon the fifth amendment rights
against self-incrimination and that the Miranda criteria had to be ful-
filled so the defendant could freely choose to take the witness stand. 10
The majority and the dissent disagreed also on the application of
Walder v. United States.1 In that case, the Court permitted impeach-
ment use of "tainted" evidence excluded from a prosecutor's case in
chief. Chief Justice Burger admitted that Walder established collat-
eral impeachment of a defendant through evidence that was unrelated
to his instant trial; however, the Chief Justice saw no problem in es-
tablishing impeachment through direct evidence, since the jury would
be aided in weighing the defendant's credibility.12 Quite the contrary,
Justice Brennan narrowly interpreted Walder as a sanction for collat-
eral impeachment and a guaranty that the defendant could freely take
the witness stand to deny all " 'the elements of the case' "113 against
him.
6. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
7. Id. at 225.
8. Id. at 225-226.
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
10. 401 U.S. at 229-230.
11. 347 U.S. 62 (1954). This case was a conflict between fourth amendment rights and
perjury. The defendant had been convicted on a federal drug violation. During his trial
he took the stand to testify that never in his life had he possessed or dealt with narcotics.
Several years earlier, however, heroin had been found in his possession through an illegal
search and seizure. This evidence was offered by the prosecutor to impeach his credibility.
The case held that a defendant could be impeached with collateral evidence if he took
the witness stand and "of his own accord ...went beyond a mere denial of complicity
in the crimes of which he was charged and made a sweeping claim." Id. at 65. Walder has
never been extended to allow impeachment use of direct evidence from an illegal search
and seizure. See Cannito v. Sigler, 321 F. Supp. 798 (D. Neb. 1971), where the attempted
use of such evidence was unsuccessful.
12. 401 U.S. at 225.
18. Id. at 229.
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The significance of the Supreme Court decision in Harris is twofold.
First, the Court continued the rather dubious practice of letting a
"tainted" in-custody statement be heard by the jury as an attack on
the defendant's credibility. Second, the Court changed the impeach-
ment test for use of "tainted" confessions from the narrow exculpatory
test to the broad and nebulous voluntary one.
In the history of excluding confessions from a prosecutor's case in
chief, the saving use of impeachment is a fairly recent innovation
developed by Chief Justice Burger in 1959 when he was a member
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.14 At the time,
Chief Justice Burger was confronted with voluntary confessions ex-
cluded because of delays in arraignment. He established a test that
would permit impeachment use, and at the same time, not infringe
upon the defendant's rights. Exculpatory 5 sections of a defendant's
voluntary statements were available for impeachment purposes. .To
administer the test, the trial judge was to compare the defendant's
in-custody confession with his trial testimony and "to receive into
evidence only that part of the written statement which does not
go to the admission of acts which constitute elements of the crime
itself."' 6 This exculpatory test for impeachment was adopted by other
federal and state courts.' 7 After 1966, the exculpatory test was 'dis-
continued by most courts8 because of a reference in Miranda to the
invalidity of distinguishing exculpatory segments from inculpatory
segments in a defendant's confession for impeachment purposes.
Miranda said all of a defendant's in-custody statements were incriminat-
ing.19
This oblique reference to impeachment with exculpatory statements
did not, however, state that voluntary confessions could never again
be used for impeachment purposes, as they had in the past. The pos-
14. Chief Justice Burger expounded his impeachment idea in the dissenting opinion
of Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959), and the majority opinion in
Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
15. A defendant's in-custody statements used to be placed in three categories: state-
ments involving facts that were subordinate to the crime; exculpatory statements that
were explanations of innocence; and confessions, the only one of the three considered in-
criminating. The modern view rejects this classification and focuses upon the rights of
the accused. 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 821 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WIG-
MORE].
16. 270 F.2d at 920-921.
17. See United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d
318, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 221 N.E.2d 541 (1966).
18. 401 U.S. at 231.
19. 384 U.S. at 476-477.
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sibility was brought up academically before Harris.20 Along with the
dissent in Harris, the theorists believed the whole spectrum of a defen-
dant's trial rights argued strongly against an impeachment use of
confessions when the Miranda criteria for interrogation had not been
met.
The majority opinion in Harris did not recognize a close relation-
ship between impeachment use and conviction use. In fact, Chief Jus-
tice Burger expressed some doubt that the Miranda safeguards were
needed to curb police misconduct. 21
Since Miranda ended the exculpatory test for admitting confessions
into 'evidence for impeachment, Chief Justice Burger in the majority
opinion in Harris needed a new test. His choice of the voluntary test
seems to have been both obvious and natural because of its long use in
excluding confessions from the courtroom and because of Miranda's
acknowledgment of its continued validity as a test.22
No one really knows what a voluntary confession 21 is; a definition
would have to include two historic developments. First, in common
law a voluntary confession was a trustworthy statement that had not
been induced by physical coercion.24 Second, the United States Su-
preme Court recognized the additional untrustworthiness of a confes-
sion produced by psychological coercion. 25 The second development
ended the clarity of the voluntary test. Finally, the Supreme Court
admitted that only a case by case determination could be used to
gauge a voluntary confession, based upon the "totality of circum-
stances"26 of the interrogation process.27 Concurrent with the last de-
velopment the Court focused more and more upon the defendant's
rights and stopped worrying whether a confession was trustworthy or
20. See Kent, Miranda v. Arizona-The Use of Inadmissible Evidence for Impeach-
ment Purposes, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1177 (1967); Comment, The Collateral Use Doctrine:
From Walder to Miranda, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 912 (1968); Comment, The Impeachment
Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 939 (1967).
21. 401 U.S. at 225.
22. "Vohntary statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
384 U.S. at 478.
23. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), where Justice Frankfurter offered
this criterion: "Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice of its maker?" Id. at 602.
24. WIGMORE, § 817.
25. See Miller and Kessel, The Confession Confusion, 49 MARQ. L. Rav. 715, 717 (1966).
26. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 606 (1961).
27. The Wigmore test for the admissibility of confessions lists voluntariness as just
one factor, and all the factors are given equal importance. WiGMORE, §§ 824-826. If a con-
fession were inadmissible to a prosecutor's case in chief because of its failure to meet any
one of the factors, Wigmore believed that no impeachment use could take place. Id. § 821.
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not.28 The voluntary test for confessions exists, but it is not really clear
whether Chief Justice Burger adopted a test or a justification for ad-
mitting confessions into evidence for impeachment.
Whether as a test, justification, or both, the Court's choice of the
voluntary standard for admitting a confession into evidence for im-
peachment purposes has three practical effects. The first effect is that
the fifth amendment protection for the accused under police interroga-
tion is made less important than the protection of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment had
long been associated with the voluntary test for confessions, and an in-
voluntary confession had been excluded from both convicting and im-
peaching use by the Court. The new criteria for confessions, supplied
by Miranda, were associated with the fifth amendment rights against
self-incrimination.29 Perhaps the fact that Harris permitted the im-
peachment use of voluntary confessions, taken in violation of the fifth
amendment, points to the essential confusion in language and purpose
in the Miranda opinion.
A second practical effect of the Harris opinion is upon the conduct
of police officers. Any error they might make in fulfilling the proce-
dural safeguards to a defendant could produce a confession, which
would be valuable evidence for a prosecutor. The confession, offered
as an attack upon the defendant's credibility, would be very believable
to a jury. A jury could not help being aware that the confession was
made closer in time to the criminal charge than the trial, and made
without the intervention of an attorney. In questioning a suspect, police
officers no longer have an incentive to live up to higher standards than
not using coercion, when the United States Supreme Court has told
them a voluntary confession is trustworthy evidence even if they violate
the Miranda procedures. No one would say police officers would delib-
erately ignore or disobey the Miranda procedures; they might if the
suspect being questioned was particularly offensive.
The third and most critical effect of the Harris decision is upon
the defendant himself. Any suspect, ignorant or educated, is unequal
28. United States v. Spano, 860 U.S. 315 (1959), where the Court said: "The abhor-
rence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone to their
inherrent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep rooted feeling that the police must
obey the law while enforcing the law .. " Id. at 320.
29. The oral arguments before the Court and the comments of the judges showed
this confusion over whether the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment, or the
sixth amendment was involved in Miranda. See MRDALIE, FROM ESCOBEDO TO MIRANDA;
THE ANATOMY OF A SUPREME COURT DECISION (1966).
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to the experience of police officers in the interrogation process.30 The
Miranda safeguards were not a solution to that psychological effect of
weakness produced by official questioning.31 Studies have shown the
warnings have not been understood, 2 or if understood, were not heeded
by suspects who unwittingly incriminated themselves.3 3 Nonetheless, the
procedural safeguards were a beginning. The impeachment use of con-
fessions obtained in violation of the Miranda procedures harms that
beginning step.
Two concepts emerge from the effects of Harris on the implemen-
tation of the Miranda procedures. Police officers need to use the in-
terrogating technique, but in using it, justice should not be sacrificed.
A bridge between these two concepts could be the fifth amendment.
Other constitutional rights are available, and other remedies have been
suggested for aiding the suspect under questioning. The other remedies
are far in the future when education might catch up to the suspect and
the police officer. Meanwhile, the fifth amendment has begun to have
some relevance to ensuring fair treatment for the accused. That rele-
vance could be strengthened if the fifth amendment could guarantee
that no police interrogation could take place unless an attorney were
present. Further confusing rules for excluding or including confessions
won't help.
Janice I. Gambino
30. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 H.,v. L. REv. 42
(1968).
31. The majority opinion in Miranda did succeed in identifying the nature of the
intimidation involved in police interrogation by quoting extensively from authorities in
the field: 384 U.S. at 449-452. 454-455, citing INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION (3d ed. 1953).
32. Medalie, Zeitz, and Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1347 (1968).
33. See note 30.
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